History of the GM Side Saddle Gas Tank Defect

The side saddle fuel tank design installed in over 10 million trucks
- all 1973-87 General Motors full-size pickups and cab-chassis trucks
(pickups without beds) and some 1988-91 dual cab or RV chassis - is the
worst auto crash fire defect in the history of the U.S. Department of
Transportation. Based on data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(formerly known as the Fatal Accident Reporting System), over 1,800 people
were killed in fire crashes involving these trucks from 1973 through 2000.
(Attachment A is a list of fatal C/K fire crashes
by state since 1993.) This is more than twenty times as many fatalities
as in the infamous Ford Pinto. Despite a voluntary recall request from
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in April 1993
(Attachment B) and an initial defect determination
by Transportation Secretary Federico Pena in October 1994 (Attachment
C), GM stubbornly refused to initiate a recall.

Like Ford and Chrysler, GM made pickups with gas tanks inside the cab in
the 1960's. Because of concerns about the safety of placing the gas tank
inside the passenger cab, the Big Three auto makers all considered relocating
the tank outside the passenger compartment in the early 1970's. Chrysler
engineers specifically rejected placing the tank outside the frame because
of safety concerns saying, "A frame mounted fuel tank mounted anywhere outside
the frame rails would be in a very questionable area due to the new Federal
Standards requiring 15 MPH side impacts for all vehicles. . . . Any side
impact would automatically encroach on this area and the probability of
tank leakage would be extremely high." (Attachment D.)

GM engineers reached a similar conclusion in their early assessments with
Chevrolet engineer Alex Mair recommending in 1964 that the fuel tank of
the next generation pickup Amust be mounted outside the cab and as near
the center of the vehicle as practical. (Attachment E.)
The safety concerns of GM engineers were overridden by management's sales
concerns who wanted to install 40 gallon capacity to get a greater driving
range, and used this as a selling point. The easiest way to achieve a 40
gallon capacity was to install two 20 gallon fuel tanks outside the frame
rail where they were more vulnerable to rupture and puncture by sharp objects
in crashes. In 1972, GM engineers recommended to the Vice President for
Engineering that if occupants were not killed by crash forces, they "should
be free from the hazards of post-collision fuel fires." (See Attachment
F.) After GM management made the decision to place the tanks outside
the frame, GM engineers recommended that shields be installed around the
tanks to protect them. (Attachment G is an engineering
diagram of one GM shield from 1972 while Attachment H
is a GM crash test photo of another shield.)

GM's Knowledge of Defect

The problems with the tanks soon became apparent to GM. Within the first
year of introduction, GM conducted a special accident study of 1973 compared
to pre-1973 pickups which showed "the 1973 trucks had more fuel leaks
from the fuel tank than did the pre-1973 pick-ups." A 1978 study by George
Garvil concluded that both the rear located and inside the frame fuel
tanks were superior to the outside-the-frame tanks. Using GM's insurance
company Motors Insurance Corp. data, Garvil found "Approximately 40 of
212 or 19%, of the side impacts were judged to have had high fuel tank
leakage potential for outboard side-located tanks. Moving these side tanks
inboard might eliminate most of these potential leakers." (See Attachment
I.)

After the fatal fire crashes begin mounting up in the mid-late 1970's,
GM again studied alternative designs including moving the tanks inside
the frame, installing a plastic liner or bladder, or using external shields
to reduce the danger of tank rupture. (Attachment J
is a GM memo considering these options for implementation in 1982 while
Attachment K is chart of different inside the frame
designs from this memo.) Crash tests of 22 GM pickups in 1981-83 to develop
protective designs revealed that the tanks "split like melons." (Attachment
L is a DOT summary description of the GM crash tests and performance
objectives for fuel systems.) GM did develop a protective steel fuel tank
cage which it installed on its 1978-83 cab chassis models (pickups without
the bed). If these cages were modified to fit the C/K pickups it could
have significantly enhanced the overall fuel system integrity of the vehicle.
GM Vice President Alex Mair sketched a simple shield costing only $23
which was termed "a probable easy fix." (Attachment
M.)

At the heart of GM's resistance to improving the safety of its fuel systems
was a cost benefit analysis done by Edward Ivey which concluded that it
was not cost effective for GM to spend more than $2.20 per vehicle to
prevent a fire death. (Attachment N.) When deposed
about his cost benefit analysis, Mr. Ivey was asked whether he could identify
a more hazardous location for the fuel tank on a GM pickup than outside
the frame. Mr. Ivey responded, "Well yes...You could put in on the front
bumper." (Video: "Ed Ivey Deposition," Attachment O
is a copy of this portion of the deposition.) GM was able to hide all
this evidence and much more from the public until the early 1990's when
leaks in GM's secrecy dam started and the Center for Auto Safety began
to focus in on the defect.

DOT's Deadly Settlement

The battle over the recall of the pickup trucks began on August 14, 1992
when the Center for Auto Safety and Public Citizen filed a recall petition
with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) detailing
serious fire hazards to owners of the 1973-87 GM pickups. (Attachment
P.) GM responded to a NHTSA inquiry prompted by the CAS petition with
a 55-page letter and 80 boxes of documents that they argued proved the
fuel tank was no danger. Although GM originally claimed confidentiality
for this material, it dropped this claim after similar documents were
released under the Texas "anti-secrecy" law 76A in Zelenuk v. GM. on December
8, 1992, the NHTSA announced that it would officially investigate the
1973-87 GM pickups.

On April 9, 1993, the NHTSA called on GM to voluntarily recall all of
its over 6 million 1973-87 full-size C/K pickups with side saddle fuel
tanks. (Attachment B.) In its official response to NHTSA's recall request,
GM refused to comply with the government's voluntary recall and instead
submitted a 50-page study supporting the safety of its trucks. NHTSA's
recall letter stated, "GM's fuel tank system in the subject vehicles contains
a defect that relates to motor vehicle safety and that GM should therefore
initiate a recall of all full-size pick-up trucks and chassis cabs (through
the 30/3500 series) sold with fuel tanks mounted outboard of the frame
rails." In its response, GM wrote, "General Motors continues to believe
that its 1973-87 C/K trucks are neither defective nor contribute to increased
injuries or fatalities. Consequently no safety recall of them is necessary."

After July 1993, NHTSA continued to gather data with the biggest single
revelation being that GM had withheld hundreds of accident reports on
C/K gas tank fires until forced to finally disclose them in February 1994.
Secretary Pena required NHTSA staff to give him two option papers, one
for and one against a recall. NHTSA staff were split with the engineers
conducting the investigation in favor of a recall and the higher level
policy staff recommending against a recall. Because the NHTSA Administrator
had recused himself for working as a consultant for GM, the decision fell
to Transportation Secretary Federico Pena.

On October 1, 1994, Secretary Pena made an initial determination that
the GM Pickups had a safety defect and that GM had known about the defect
since the early 1970's and had not remedied the defect or warned the public.
(Attachment C.) In an accompanying statement, Secretary Pena accused GM
management of having "made a decision favoring sales over safety." (Attachment
Q.) Just six weeks later on December 2, 1994, Secretary Pena reversed
himself and signed an unprecedented agreement negotiated by high level
Justice Department officials with GM to close the GM pickup investigation
in exchange for an illusory commitment of $51 million by GM to safety
programs.

During these six weeks, GM applied political pressure to force Secretary
Pena to fold. on November 3, Rep. Bob Carr from Michigan ordered an investigation
by the Inspector General of Pena's decision. on November 10, the Chief
Executive Officers of Chrysler, Ford and General Motors wrote President
Clinton seeking his intervention to "address the intolerable state of
regulatory uncertainty that will otherwise result from Secretary Pena's
decision." The Big Three CEO's stressed that Secretary Pena's decision
would have an adverse financial impact on each of their companies and
argued that DOT should be prohibited from doing defect recalls where there
was an applicable safety standard that the vehicle met.

On November 17, GM filed a lawsuit in Federal District Court in Detroit,
whose primary purpose was to open the backdoor to the Justice Department
for negotiations to scuttle the investigation. The Justice Department
attorney assigned to the case not only was a former associate from O'Melveny
& Myers whose flagship client was Ford Motor Company, he also owned
$4,000 of GM stock. More important than owning the GM stock was the fact
that the Justice attorney had worked on defending Ford defects while in
private practice and knew that the position taken by GM would benefit
Ford, his former client, in defense of future cases.

The Deal

The settlement deal negotiated by the Justice Department was full of
flaws and conditions that make it a deadly deal for the American public.
The following are a few examples.

(1) The deal prevented DOT from going forward with a public hearing at
which extensive new technical information on crash severity and defect
failure modes, new accident data and analyzes showing a much higher death
toll, a comprehensive analysis of all GM recalls to show unreasonable
risk, new internal GM documents on prior knowledge and inexpensive fixes
foregone, and new demonstrative physical evidence and computer simulations
would have been presented to make an enforcement proceeding far easier.
At a public hearing, DOT could have asked GM for the first time about
its $23 "probable easy fix" from 1982; what happened to the 1973 safety
shield that was used in the only successful 30-mph crash test for the
new C/K pickup; and the ability of bladder liners to stop fuel tank ruptures.

(2) The deal purported to commit GM to spending $51 million on various
alternative safety programs to save hundreds of lives. But no documentation
showing that these programs had saved hundreds of lives was ever provided.
GM did not even have to put up cash but was allowed to put up equivalent
facilities, staff and salaries. Moreover, GM was free to spend the money
where it wanted. If GM wanted to give public education money to the American
Coalition for Traffic Safety, which lobbied to stop the C/K recall, it
could do so.

(3) The deal was the very first defect settlement in which no remedy
was offered to owners of the defective vehicle. At best, it could be said
that some owners were asked to die so that others might live - but no
one consulted the potential victims about whether they wanted to die.

Legal Action

Meanwhile, GM has had to deal with mounting lawsuits from deaths and
injuries in fires in these pick-ups. on February 4, 1993 in the trial
of Moseley v. GM, the court found General Motors liable and awarded $4.5
million in compensatory damages and $101 million in punitive damages.
This decision, however, was reversed by the Georgia Court of Appeals primarily
because the trial attorneys relied on GM testimony to support their claims
of other similar incidents (OSI's) rather than demonstrative OSI evidence.
Significantly, the Court went out of its way to say that the '101 million
punitive damage award was not excessive given the circumstances. GM settled
the Moseley suit rather than face a retrial. At the same time that GM
settled Moseley, it settled at least 11 other C/K pickup cases scheduled
to go to trial in 1995 for $100 million. The total amount in settlements
paid out by GM in C/K pickup fire crashes is over $500 million.

General Motors was also confronted with numerous state class actions, which
were consolidated into a Multi-District Litigation (MDL) in the Federal
District Court in Philadelphia. The MDL involved 49 states, while a separate
state class action continued in Texas. Both class actions were settled by
offering $1,000 coupon good towards the purchase of a new GM truck or van
to current owners of C/K pickups. The settlements were challenged by the
Center for Auto Safety on behalf of individual objectors plus some state
and local governments. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District
of Texas on June 22, 1994 overturned the Texas class action settlement on
1973-87 GM pickups with side saddle gas tanks. Bloyed v. General Motors
Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App. 1994), aff'd, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996).
The Court had words for both GM and the Plaintiff Attorneys who got nearly
$10 million in hard cash for themselves and paper coupons for consumers.
In its stern rebuke, the Court pointed out that the Plaintiffs "instituted
this suit because of the hazard posed by the side-saddle gasoline tank,
yet this issue is given scant attention in the settlement agreement."

Lawyers defending the identical settlement for the other 49 states underwent
a harsh 4-hour grilling by the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
on August 11. Like the Texas Court, the Federal Court questioned the fairness
of the national class action settlement and what it did for safety. The
Court had serious questions about whether the settlement had any value for
consumers, the amount of the attorney fees and the way they were negotiated
without notice to the class. In April 1995, the Third Circuit reversed the
trial court's approval of the coupon settlement in a scathing and lengthy
page opinion rebuking the court, class counsel, and GM. In Re: General Motors
Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (1995, CA3
Pa), cert. den. GMC v. French, 64 USLW 3241 (Oct. 3, 1995). GM's attempt
to obtain Supreme Court review of this decision
was rejected in October of 1995. The case went back before the federal trial
court for proceedings consistent with the Third Circuit's order.

On December 19, 1996, a state court judge in Louisiana approved a new class
action settlement covering all GM truck owners. White, et al. v. General
Motors Corp., et al., No. 42,865 (Iberville Parish Dist. Ct., December 19,
1996). The settlement includes an improved economic element plus a provision
that GM would contribute $4.1 million to a fuel safety research fund but
which could not cover C/K pickups, and a stipulation under which the attorneys
for the class set up a $1 million research fund to develop and implement
a fix for the GM C/K fuel system hazards. Former NHTSA Associate Administrator
for Research, Dr. Kennerly Digges, was appointed by the Court as the Independent
Trustee for both research projects. on June 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals
of the Louisiana First Circuit overturned the second settlement. White v.
General Motors Corp., 718 So.2d 480 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1998). A third settlement
was then reached which provided that up to $4 million would be added to
the C/K research fund by having $5 from the sale of each of the first 800,000
coupons donated to ensure the manufacture and distribution of the pickup
fuel system remedy. Dr. Digges formed the Automotive Safety Research Institute
(ASRI) to carry out the research and has developed a retrofit inside the
frame fuel tank that will successfully withstand a 50 mph side impact from
a full size Chevrolet Caprice, a test used by NHTSA to determine the side
saddle C/K pickup was defective. (Attachment R, Attachment
S and Attachment T are ASRI reports relating
to retrofit testing. Video: "NHTSA Crash Test" is the 50mph NHTSA crash
test while Video: "40 MPH Crash Test" is the ASRI 40mph crash test of the
retrofit tank. Video: "Fuel Tank Location" is a comparison of the ASRI retrofit
inside the frame fuel tank compare to the original outside the frame fuel
tank on a C/K pickup.)

Data updated through 1999 from NHTSA's Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS), show that over 1,800 people have been killed in fire crashes in
the U.S. in 1973-87 GM C/K pickups and cab-chassis trucks with the defective
outside-the-frame-rail sidesaddle fuel tank design. Just since DOT's deadly
deal with GM to drop its recall efforts in December 1994, over 330 people
have died in C/K pickup fire crashes. The side saddle pickup design continues
to claim more lives in 2001 than any other single defect.

To describe one example, on May 21, 1997, in Carson City, NV, an elderly
married couple in a 1978 C/K pickup were both instantaneously immolated
when they ran a stop sign at a city intersection and were struck just behind
the passenger door by a crossing pickup truck. The fireball resulting from
the exploding fuel tank engulfed the other truck as well, and while the
18-year-old driver of the second truck was still conscious when pulled from
the burning cab by a witness to the crash, he was burned so severely that
his young life ended in a Las Vegas hospital burn unit within the week.
Witnesses at the scene recounted that he lay on the ground and was able
to ask "Why?" three or four times. The answer to this question, of course,
could be found not so much in a Nevada intersection as in Washington, DC
and in GM's Michigan headquarters.